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Abstract:
In Beyond Learned Helplessness, Professor Gregg Bloche surveys the wreckage
of past attempts at health care cost containment, and responds with a typical inside-theBeltway solution: an expert independent agency. The agency will “set a national agenda
for clinical outcomes research, support this research in dependable fashion, develop costbenefit trade-off principles for medical coverage, and formulate coverage protocols based
on these principles.” The resultant scheme would place “binding limits on covered
services for Medicare and other federally-funded insurance programs, including
extension of coverage to the uninsured. . . [and] a model for the private sector, state
Medicaid programs, and state efforts to reduce the numbers of the uninsured.”
Count us doubtful. The history of expert independent agencies does not inspire
optimism. Industrial policy has not succeeded in any other area in which it has been tried;
price and wage controls, telecommunications, airlines, ground transportation, and
agriculture all count as notable failures. If the history of administrative agencies has
taught us anything, it is that expertise offers no shield against the corrosive effects of bias
– particularly when government regulation is beset by the same problems with
information and coordination that make markets difficult to operate.
Decentralized market actors are often better able to identify and use relevant
information than a single sclerotic government agency that is beset with administrative
and political problems of its own. There is little to be gained by attacking the intractable
problems of modern health care policy with process-oriented solutions. A direct attack
on the substantive issues is necessary.
In section I, we offer a brief critique of the system of positive rights and merit
goods that underlie the case for most forms of universal health care coverage. In section
II, we identify three practical problems that no working politician can wish away in the
effort to implement universal health care coverage: the fundamental principle of
diminishing marginal utility; the destabilizing impact of heavily subsidized governmentprovided coverage on the private market; and the treatment of the full range of existing
regulations affecting the delivery of health care services as an exogenous given. We
address each of these deficiencies in turn. In section III, we examine briefly six areas
where we think massive deregulation is in order: medical malpractice, HIPAA, federal
tax law, fraud and abuse, health insurance regulation, and certificate of need/scope of
practice limitations.
We anticipate that our proposals will be met by howls of protest from those who
benefit from the status quo and their apologists. Such complaints should be seen for what
they are – a defense of rent-seeking by incumbent providers. The whole point of
deregulation is to limit the opportunity and rewards of rent-seeking, thereby increasing
consumer surplus. No administrative agency or committee of experts, no matter how
well intentioned and knowledgeable, will be able to do a better job of meeting consumer
demands than the private market. To think otherwise is to repeat the mistakes of the past,
instead of learning from them.

2

I. Introduction: Industrial Policy Comes to Health Care
In Beyond Learned Helplessness, Professor Gregg Bloche surveys the wreckage
of past attempts at health care cost containment. To these he responds with a typical
inside-the-Beltway solution: an expert independent agency is just the ticket to solve all
our problems. The agency will “set a national agenda for clinical outcomes research,
support this research in dependable fashion, develop cost-benefit trade-off principles for
medical coverage, and formulate coverage protocols based on these principles.” The
resultant scheme would place “binding limits on covered services for Medicare and other
federally-funded insurance programs, including extension of coverage to the uninsured. .
. [and] a model for the private sector, state Medicaid programs, and state efforts to reduce
the numbers of the uninsured.”
Count us doubtful. Although poor past performance does not guarantee future
failures, the history of expert independent agencies does not inspire optimism, for it is
plagued with all the difficulties of setting industrial policy from the center. We take
seriously the insights of the Hayekian tradition that decentralized market actors are better
able to identify and use relevant information than a single sclerotic government agency
that is beset with administrative and political problems of its own. We also note that
industrial policy has not succeeded in any other area in which it has been tried: price and
wage controls, telecommunications, airlines, ground transportation, agriculture—count as
notable failures. We see no reason why that moth-eaten approach should be able to
succeed here where the problems with information and coordination that make markets
difficult to operate also bedevil government regulation.

Even in the best of all

circumstances, the world has moved on before the ink has dried on commission reports
that have been vetted by multiple times before publication. Choosing a bipartisan expert
commission – to which the Council on Clinical Standards bears an uncomfortable
similarity -- does not improve the prospects for centralized planning. If the history of
administrative agencies has taught us anything, the insistence on expertise offers no
shield against the corrosive effects of bias.
Speaking more generally, we think that there is little to be gained to attacking the
intractable problems of modern health care policy with process oriented solutions. A
direct attack on the substantive issues is necessary. The responsible policy analyst is duty
3

bound to explain which govern programs should be kept as is, which should be modified,
and which should be scrapped altogether. In approaching these contentious issues, our
experience is that it takes only two words to identify the major issues in health care
policy: access and cost. Quality is the third contender, but we defer treatment of it to
another day, and content ourselves with the simple observation that if open access is
secured, market forces will go a long way to taking care of the quality issues. Returning
to the main theme, unfortunately, most discussions of the twin imperatives of cost and
access treat them as though they inhabited separate realms. Thus it is commonplace,
especially in the context of contested Presidential elections, for all sorts of ambitious
schemes to be proposed – focusing on either access or cost, with little consideration given
to the connection between them. In general political discussions, the issue of access is
thought to carry with it the greater salience because of the ease with which it possible to
complete the sentence, “The American health care system has failed because it does not
provide insurance for X million people, and supplies only inadequate insurance for an
additional Y individuals.” At this point it is necessary only to fill in the blanks for both
numbers, after which it is a short step to advocating a new (if not improved) government
program to supply health care coverage to these additional individuals.
In order to make good on our proposals, we proceed as follows. In section I, we
offer some brief critique of the system of positive rights and merit goods that underlies
the case for most forms of universal health care coverage. In section II, we identify three
practical problems that no working politician can wish away in the effort to implement
universal health care coverage.

First, is the fundamental principle of diminishing

marginal utility. Second, is the destabilizing impact of heavily subsidized governmentprovided coverage on the private market. Third, is the treatment of the full range of
existing regulations affecting the delivery of health care services as an exogenous given.
We address each of these deficiencies in turn. In section III, we examine briefly six areas
where we think massive deregulation is in order: medical malpractice, HIPAA, federal
tax law, fraud and abuse, health insurance regulation, and certificate of need/scope of
practice limitations.
Positive Rights and Merit Goods. The particular proposals that we criticize do
not arise in some intellectual vacuum, but are the outgrowth of a consistent if erroneous
4

world view that stresses the importance of positive rights and entitlements, which in turn
generates a distinctive conception of “merit goods” to which advocates of universal
coverage proposals, of the sort propounded by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama,
instinctively gravitate. To set the stage for the particular inquiries that follow, we say a
few words about these interrelated concepts.
The intellectual framework in which we operate is not one devoid of rights.
Rather it stresses, as is common in medical-legal discussions, the principle of individual
autonomy, which is in our view sufficient to allow individuals to decide to decline, or
accept, medical treatment for whatever reasons they see fit, including those which other
citizens and public official find wholly unsatisfactory.2 Our position is not that these
individuals are always correct in their judgments. Instead, it is that they have strong
incentives to gather the information necessary to make the “correct” decision in light of
their own preferences – and they are likely to make fewer mistakes when they make their
own decisions, compared to the mistakes that will be forced to accept if others are
allowed, either in whole or in part, to arrogate decisionmaking authority. Our conception
of medical autonomy is not, however, limited simply to patient choice. Instead it is an
outgrowth of a larger conception of individual autonomy that applies to all persons,
including those who supply health care services. They too have the right to decide
whether to offer or decline to offer the services in question. The notion of individual
autonomy is thus embedded in a larger classical liberal framework in which individual
choice is protected against the external use or threat of force, and is augmented by the
ability to contract with other persons on whatever terms and conditions are seen fit,
barring fraud and duress. The notion of an entitlement or positive right to health care
(i.e., a right against the state, whose payment is funded by taxation) is not part of our
system, nor is part of the classical liberal tradition – even though it is central to both the
Clinton and Obama health care positions.
The merit and application of this “negative rights” view of state power transcends
health care services, although it admits of exceptions for network industries, common
2

For a recent defense of the position, see Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of
Individual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 Geo. L.J.
559 (2008).
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carriers, and monopolists.

Those conditions apart, this system has several real

advantages over any regime of positive rights – and those advantages become particularly
apparent in the health care context.
The first of these is that the rules of individual autonomy and voluntary exchange
are not tied to any level of social wealth or medical knowledge.

The institutional

arrangements make sense in societies with both primitive and advanced medical
knowledge. The state therefore is relieved of the Herculean necessity of setting out the
terms and conditions under which services are provided, which it must necessarily
undertake in any regime of positive rights. In this voluntarist universe, the private parties
know their resource limitations, and thus will not willingly make promises that they know
they cannot keep.

Government programs that institute positive rights, however,

constantly have to make collective judgments about technical possibilities and resource
availability, neither of which they can do well. Worse still, their errors are not randomly
distributed, but tend to skew in the direction of promising more at lower cost than they
can possibly deliver.
The combination of individual autonomy and private agreement has a second
advantage. It is easily scalable. The rules of autonomy and exchange work for all levels
of wealth in both large and small groups. The legal rules of the system thus remain
constant regardless of the rate of medical progress and the size of new social groups.
Accordingly, there is no risk in a voluntary system that government regulation will
impose resource demands on private firms of social programs that they are not able to
meet. In addition, all individuals have the additional assurance that their cost for health
care and health insurance depends on their personal characteristics and not the members
of some larger group which they are forced to join for insurance purposes.

The

politicking on the definition of the relevant unit for insurance, which is so important for
mandated health plans, plays no role in a voluntary market that allows for lots of sorting
by both the purchasers and the consumers of medical care. The voluntary market also
allows for superior matching by the extensive use of various kinds of brokers and third
parties. Coercive state systems simply cannot have those desirable sorting properties, nor
are they readily scalable. Indeed, centrally dictated reforms are simply not intended to
improve the lot of all individuals through cooperation and mutual aid; instead they use
6

pooling methods to redistribute wealth, often covertly, among members of the stateconstructed pool.
Aggressive conceptions of positive rights are usually tied to the claim that health
care constitutes a “merit” good that should not be rationed on the ability to pay, but
should instead be provided on some socially constructed scale of need.3 At the outset, we
note that when rightly understood, merit goods are fully compatible with markets.
Assume that all individuals attend a private school in which students pay tuition and are
graded for their performance. It is quite right to speak of the grade as a merit good
because individual students have to earn their grade by performance in class and on
examinations. They cannot simply obtain an A by offering more money for the grade
than their fellow students, or paying more tuition. Merit plays the same role in athletic
contests or prize competitions. People may pay to enter the competition. They cannot
pay to win it, for to do so commits a fraud on third parties whose respect for the results
depends critically on the processes by which they are achieved. The stress on the close
connection between merit and recognition not only to private institutions, but to public
ones as well.

So long as institutions wish to praise or measure some form of

achievement, then cannot put the relevant grades, medals or prizes up to bid. Let it be
announced, or even suspected that cash payments—now called bribes—of the
participants determined the outcome, then the entire enterprise flounders, with large
financial and reputational repercussions to the organizations that let this happen. It is for
this reason that the Motion Picture Association is so skittish about the voting for Oscars.
Rigged bids spell the demise of this system of honors.
The effort to import some notion of merit goods into the health care debate has
nothing to do with this coherent account of merit goods. Instead, within the framework
of any system of positive rights, merit goods are defined negatively, so that they represent
those goods that “we” think should not be allocated in a market system that respects
consumer sovereignty. Once that step is taken, the actual basis for allocation will differ
widely, but never on the conventional conception of a merit good. In some instances, the
motivation for this second-generation of merit goods is outright paternalism, premised on
3
See generally, Richard A. Musgrave, "Merit goods," 3 The New Palgrave: A
Dictionary of Economics 452-53 (1987).
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the implausible assumption that the state can make better judgments for individuals than
they can for themselves. Even if one thinks that explanation has some plausibility some
of the time, it would not compel the adoption of any form of universal health care
coverage unless we also assume that the large majority of the population with less than
“Cadillac” coverage do not understand their own true interest.4
Nor can this broader account be saved by insisting an expanded definition of
merit goods is necessary to counteract negative externalities. Any such claim represents
a confusion of categories. Negative externalities—pollution or monopoly, for example—
supply an independent potential basis for regulation wholly without regard to any false
framing of the dispute over “merit goods” as that term is now used in the health care
debate.

No matter how described, however, this belated invocation of negative

externalities is a double-edged sword. After all, one of the arguments against providing
universal health care is the broad negative financial consequences it has on many
individuals who are forced to participate in the program in order to subsidize the care
received by others. It is nice to call this maneuver “social insurance” but that term
conceals more than it reveals. Insurance contracts are devices for risk smoothing that
leave all plan participants better off in expectation than by staying out. Social insurance
is a way to pool risk but to redistribute the premiums so that some individuals are, by
design, systematically left worse off than if they could purchase their insurance, or refuse
to purchase insurance, in voluntary markets. The phrase then is an alluring oxymoron,
not a subset of standard insurance contracts. It seeks to use the favorable connotation that
insurance has in voluntary markets, and twists its meaning to disguise its redistributive
agenda which, if sound, has to be defended in its own terms.
Any discussion of social insurance thus invites the third, and most pervasive
explanation for calling something a merit good: the explicit defense of coercive
redistribution for that good, but not for others. Yet, as with both positive rights and
social insurance, the invocation of “merit goods” does little to answer the question of
how much redistribution should be allowed. Surely there are approaches that allow for
some public support for health care without embracing the position that health care is a
4

See generally Clark C. Havighurst & Barak Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in
American Health Care, 69 L. & Contemp. Probs. 7 (2006).
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pure merit good that should be funded by (progressive) taxes and supplied to all equally
regardless of their ability to pay, and the net social benefits that will come from its
provision in question.
In fact, the use of the term merit good operates as an unfortunate show-stopper in
an otherwise difficult debate. Our statute books are littered with programs in which
special nonmarket arguments are said to require huge subsidies to preferred groups,
wholly without regard to the distortions that are created when these explicit or implicit
subsidies are introduced. How else is one to define the raft of agricultural subsidies, rent
control and labor statutes that rest on claims that the market does a terrible job in
supplying particular goods, without asking whether the new programs do better across all
cases? Merit goods, hardly. Demerit goods seems a more appropriate description.
Nor do we have any reason to believe that any programs that sought to implement
the idea of merit goods could work successfully in their own right. The most obvious
point is that the level of health is only partially dependent on the level of health care that
is provided under that name. Good habits, education, safe occupations, teenage birth rate,
crime rates, and a thousand of other factors influence the levels of health care, and help
explain why in cross-country comparison, the correlation between expenditures on health
care correlate so weakly with health.5 These goods cannot all be “merit” goods. Some
must be purchased in the market place. The upshot is that persons who are denied the
ability to spend additional resources on health care will substitute other goods and
services that will help them achieve their health ends. Our prediction finds support in a
recent study by June and Dave O’Neill, which shows that the gradient on survival as a
function of income is, if anything, steeper in the Canadian system than it is in the
American system: expenses outside the health care system really matter.6 In view of
these findings, we think it highly unlikely that we can achieve both widespread health
care improvements and parity of health care across income levels simultaneously.

5

June E. O’Neill & Dave M. O’Neill, Health Status, Health Care and Inequality:
Canada vs. the U.S., NBER, working paper 13,429, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13429
(2007), at 3 (as accounting for the two-year greater life expectancy in Canada).
6
O’Neill & O’Neill, supra, reporting inter alia, that “more US residents than
Canadians answered fully satisfied and excellent.” Id at 2.
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Nonetheless, it appears that the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is now ready to
attempt squaring the circle with the formation of a non-partisan Commission, headed by
Mark McClellan and Alice Rivlin, to address how these multiple social factors influence
health.7 But there is good reason to think that this project runs serious risk of failure.
The central missionof this non-partisan Commission is “to identify and recommend
practical solutions to eliminate health disparities and improve health for all Americans.”
The latter goal is consistent with market methods, but the only way to “eliminate health
disparities” is to champion a strong view of redistribution that will likely frustrate the
objective of cross-the-board improvement. The unspoken secret is that on balance there
is a higher social rate of return from securing better health care for “productive” citizens
than for “unproductive” citizens, if only to increase the resource base for the next
generation.
Having said this much we freely confess—indeed insist—that, even if health
parity regardless of wealth suffers from the incurable weakness of any radical egalitarian
program, there will always be some case for a subsidy for health care among the needy;
no one thinks that wealth is an adequate and complete proxy for well-being at the
extremes of the income distribution. But the use of the term “merit” good, the easy
invocation of positive rights to anything and everything, the demands for perfect parity
all suffer from one defect: they blind us to the key questions of degree that matters so
much on health care issues. Worse still, they turn our attention away from sensible
pricing systems that could broaden the choices available to the very individuals that are
the ostensible beneficiaries of merit-based claims.
Once again, therefore, we think that it is best to bracket any supposed merit issue,
by focusing on how best to increase access and reduce costs. It may well be in the end
that significant subsidies for lower-income persons might be desirable. Health care is a
field where there is a near-universal sense (from all parts of the political spectrum) that
the unfortunate should be taken care of. But we think that the better strategy is to start
the other way around. Begin with market liberalization first and move to subsidies only

7

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to Launch National Commission to Address
Why So Many Americans are Sicker and Die Younger than Others: Mark McClellan,
Alice Rivlin to Lead the National Effort, February 28, 2008.
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once the limits of that initial approach are identified. Redistribution always increases
taxes, reduces revenue, and reduces output in all relevant dimensions. The burden of
justification for compelled subsidies is higher than it is for reforms that reduce costs,
increase access, and reduce taxation. So we should start there.
III. The Systematic Shortfalls of Universal Care.
A. Rising Marginal Costs We are now in a position to turn to the three major
structural difficulties with any universal health care system. The first of these involves
the rising marginal cost as public institutions seek to make their coverage provisions
more and more comprehensive. In many institutional settings, costs and problems are not
distributed pro rata across populations. If anything, the problem becomes more acute as
the populations become more heterogeneous along any relevant dimension—including
those which are not perceived or understood by those designing the plan. Thus, it is
commonplace to observe that 5% of patients are responsible for 95% of the
administrative problems.
It is not necessary to impugn the character of those involved to observe that selfinterest creates an incentive to game (and even defraud) any system that is set up. Yet, it
is difficult to ignore the devastating consequences to system integrity that follow when
any plan attempts to bring within its scope the tiny fraction of individuals that will do just
that.8 The last five percent will on average, be individuals for whom it is substantially
more costly to provide services. They are likely to be poor, to have low human capital,
and, in at least some appreciable fraction of the cases, to engage in self-destructive habits
on a repetitive basis. Any program with universal coverage as its goal is, by definition,
unable to weed out these troublemakers – even though the failure to do so makes the
system less responsive to the health care needs of the rest of the population. The result of
forced inclusion of this population is the counter-productive siphoning away of resources
that would otherwise be devoted to individuals with more favorable risk profiles.
Those pushing these reforms have a Pollyannaish optimism on this point,
assuming that new individuals can be brought within the system without displacing or

8
For a recent plea to avoid covering these bad apples, see Peter Schuck & Richard
Zeckhauser, Targeting Social Programs, Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples
(2007).
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otherwise placing at risk the health care that is now provided to persons already within
the system. Yet, the history of numerous government programs provides ample reasons
for skepticism that this problem can be solved – particularly given the due process
limitations likely to be imposed on attempts to police such (mis)conduct. A goal of
trying to address the problems of only 95% of the population may sound defeatist, but in
the end it has far greater chances of success than any utopian vision of universal coverage
that tries to shoehorn in the last 5%.
B. Distortions by Regulation, Taxation and Subsidy The second deficiency is
ignoring the likely destabilizing influence of government-provided insurance (with its full
array of regulations, taxes and subsidies) on the private market. To be sure, this problem
is a sign of progress; there does not currently appear to be much enthusiasm for a onepayer system, which would make the state the sole financing party, and render illegal any
action that seeks to purchase private insurance.

This progress may simply be the

recognition of political reality; after the demise of the (Bill) Clinton plan, we cannot see
any reform that has as a necessary consequence a reduction in the level of access to
health care that is already provided to Medicare beneficiaries and other preferred groups.
In particular, it is no accident that both the Obama and (Hillary) Clinton health
plans take a quite different approach than the (Bill) Clinton health plan – announcing to
all people that “if you are happy with your current health coverage, keep your health care
coverage (through employer or individual coverage.”)9 The Obama plan seeks to convey
the same basic message, with even more dizzying optimism: “If you already have health
insurance, the only thing that will change for you under this plan is the amount of money
you will spend on premiums. That will be less.”10 The basic theme is not taxes but
“choices,” which are claimed to be greater than ever before.

Under both plans,

individuals may keep their current coverage; they can acquire a coverage that is good as
that which Congress has for its own members; and they can get full parity for mental
health coverage. With the stress on prevention, and the removal of (unspecified) hidden
9
American Health Choices Plan: Quality, Affordable Health Care for Every
American.”
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan/americanhealthchoicesplan.pdf
10
Healthcare:
Plan
for
a
Healthy
America,
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/healthcare/.
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taxes, the promise is that the current revenue streams will be able to cover all the
additional coverages, especially when the Bush tax cuts to persons earning more than
$250,000 are repealed.
Such plans represent a sensible, but not impregnable, moral vision that some
minimum level of health care is a state responsibility and additional coverage should be
made available to those who are not content with their existing options. The harder
question in this case is whether these plans can make good on their central promise to
expand the available options, most notably, the ability to keep one’s current form of
insurance if that is desired. For a number of reasons, we think that this attractive slogan
will be unattainable in the end. (The claim that premiums will decline by thousands of
dollars is, of course, preposterous.) Both the Clinton and the Obama plan, for example,
include in their coverage options the ability to enroll in the Federal Employee Health
Benefit Program (FEHBP), whose benefits are estimated to be 15 percent more generous
than those found currently in Medicare.11 We agree with Benjamin Zycher that the
political pressures on this point will be impossible to resist.12 One obvious question is
whether present Medicare participants will be able to opt-into the FEHBP. If so, they
will do so in droves. It is hardly likely that the age group that today receives the most
heavily subsidized form of health care will be forced to take a back seat to any Johnnycome-lately group. We think that any FEHBP-based plan will be made available to
Medicare participants one way or the other.
In pricing its various health care options, the new Clinton and Obama programs
make a further error in that they implicitly assume that adding more people to the covered
pool lowers aggregate risk. Unfortunately, mandatory pools are not scalable.

Nor do

they address any of the administrative problems associated with what we are confident
will be decreasing returns to scale. If the cost of providing coverage to those currently in
the FEHBP is lower than doing so for new entrants, the provision of will require an
upward adjustment in revenues just to cover expenses. The administrative burdens are
still greater.
11
See Benjamin Zycher, Free to Choose? Why Private Health Insurance Won’t
Survive Under the Clinton and Obama Health Care Plans, Medical Progress Today.Com,
February 15, 2008.
12
Id.
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The difficulties do not stop here. Additional coverage will cost money – if past
history is any guide, substantially more than is projected. Funding such coverage will
require broad-based increases in taxes, and higher taxes will reduce the after-tax income
available for privately insured individuals to pay the necessary premiums to stay in their
current plan.

The surge in demand will also create pressures on the cost side –

particularly since the proposed reforms do not include much in the way of strategies
squeezing out excessive care (i.e. care which costs more than it is worth). Accordingly,
the spill-over effects from heavily subsidized increased public spending are likely to be
large. The combination of less after-tax income and higher costs could easily result in a
squeeze on private coverage. Private employers will be tempted to ditch plans as many
employees gravitate toward the subsidized coverages supplied by government.

The

situation will not be eased if these national health care plans impose the rigid set of price
controls that are implicit in the promised expansive coverage and low costs. The Obama
plan, for example, lays its intentions bare when it states confidently:
National Health Insurance Exchange: The Obama plan will create a
National Health Insurance Exchange to help individuals who wish to purchase a
private insurance plan. The Exchange will act as a watchdog group and help
reform the private insurance market by creating rules and standards for
participating insurance plans to ensure fairness and to make individual coverage
more affordable and accessible. Insurers would have to issue every applicant a
policy, and charge fair and stable premiums that will not depend upon health
status.

The Exchange will require that all the plans offered are at least as

generous as the new public plan and have the same standards for quality and
efficiency. The Exchange would evaluate plans and make the differences among
the plans, including cost of services, public.
Employer Contribution: Employers that do not offer or make a
meaningful contribution to the cost of quality health coverage for their employees
will be required to contribute a percentage of payroll toward the costs of the
national plan. Small employers that meet certain revenue thresholds will be
exempt.

14

Similarly, the Clinton program contains an explicit “guaranteed issue” component
where by any person who applies for coverage must be taken in so long as they pay their
premiums, which are again set by government, without the ability to vary by the risk of
the insured. The requirement of automatic renewal, but not at voluntary rates, is yet
another nail in the coffin. No matter how lofty the rhetoric, the bottom line is a system of
price controls.
The cumulative effect of these provisions is staggering. No insurance company
could survive the system of watchdog regulation that requires increased coverage
mandates, imposes extensive price controls, and eliminates all underwriting discretion on
key matters of coverage and extent. Profit is revenue minus costs. For these plans, the
operative definition of “profit” seems to be, cost minus revenues. Even if the employers
wanted to keep offering coverage in this hostile environment, in order to avoid the
payroll tax, it is quite likely they could find no sellers at the administratively set prices.
In the end, these massive conditions will undermine the stability of private plans.
Recall, the only promise that is being made is that the state will not ban one’s existing
coverage – not that the employer or health care provider will choose to continue
supplying the current health care plan once the basic economic conditions on both the
demand and the cost side have radically changed. In time, high taxes and large subsidies
will combine to drive most of these plans out of business. The rate, standards, and
reporting regulations will help finish off the job. Where and when that the tipping point
comes, no one can say in advance. Indeed in all likelihood the private plans that remain
will tenaciously survive in the new environment. But in the end, our gloomy prediction
is that a cascade will develop whereby first some plans will fail, placing greater pressures
on the overall health care system, which will in turn lead other plans to fail.
For those who are skeptical of this movement, it is worthwhile to reflect on the
parallel history of workers’ compensation plans.13 These plans began on a voluntary
basis in the 1860s in England, chiefly with high-risk industries like mining and railroads.
These plans flourished for about 30 years until the adoption of mandatory coverages
under the 1897 Workmen’s Compensation Act, which contained a provision identical to
13
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that in the Obama program, requiring all private plans to provide benefits at least as
generous as those in the state program.14 The voluntary plans disappeared, as they could
not meet the mandates imposed upon them.
We think that the massive amounts of redistribution associated with these plans
are, in the long run, wholly inconsistent with the maintenance of a competitive market. If
one of these plans is adopted, in time there will be only one source of funding for health
care in the US – meaning that we will have gotten a one-payer system after several small
steps, instead of one big step. Stated differently, the operation of a private market is
dependent on the larger economic and social framework of which it is a part. Under any
system with universal aspirations, private plans are always at risk – even if they are
grudgingly allowed to formally remain in business.
C. The forgotten alternative: deregulation. The third global defect associated
with the political preoccupation with access is that all existing regulations on the
provision of health care are treated as an exogenous given. There is no effort to rethink
the way in which these systems operate, and whether they are consistent with any longterm and systematic effort to provide high quality health care at low prices. We make no
secret of our antipathy to much of the current regulatory framework, which increases
costs and reduces choices. We are therefore especially concerned about any strategy that
treats the current framework of health care delivery as being off limits — at least until
such time as universal health care is put into place, at which point we will be further
locked into the current dysfunctional state of affairs. Instead our view is that we should
systematically deregulate on a number of fronts in ways that will help increase the quality
and reduce the cost of health care.
Once that happens, the access and quality problems will start to take care of
themselves. As costs are reduced and choices are increased, some individuals who are
now priced out (or opt out) of the health care system will have an incentive to come back
in. Unlike the access-first approach that raises taxes and imposes other hidden burdens,
our approach will raise revenues (through higher profits) and human satisfaction (through
the provision of better health care services). Those who are the “best bets” for benefiting
from health care will filter back into the system – expanding coverage without running
14
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into the steep marginal cost curves that otherwise dominate the analysis of any universal
health care system.
The obvious question is the magnitude of these effects. Pure theory does not
provide an answer to such questions – but given the current degree of over-regulation of
the health care delivery marketplace, it seems likely that that a system of regulatory
liberalization will have major effects, at least so long as the major targets of opportunity
are addressed.
We stress that there is no single magic bullet that is able to respond to the
problems we face. The question of increased costs always takes place along separate and
multiple margins, which tend to interact with one another in unfortunate ways.
Deregulation should exhibit the same interconnections, only now, happily, in reverse: we
expect synergistic effects as multiple regulatory regimes are cut back or dismantled
simultaneously. Unlike the promises of presidential hopefuls, there is no single grand
solution that will dig us out of the regulatory mess that we have created for ourselves.
Instead, a series of systematic efforts will change conditions at the margin.
The elimination of inefficient regulation should be congenial to persons on all
sides of the political spectrum. After all, even a one-payer government-run system is one
that should work better if the direct provision of health care is run efficiently. Whatever
one’s sentiment toward one-payer systems, it is hard to explain why more regulation on
the delivery side of the health care market is desirable when measured against either of
the relevant parameters (cost and access).
We now turn to a short list of “low hanging fruit” that should be high on the list of
any deregulatory agenda. Most of the low hanging fruit is based on the presumption that
health care is provided more or less through the channels that are common today, with
individual physicians or physician groups playing a dominant role in the provision of
health care services. The last reform, which may well be the most important at all, is also
the most sweeping: we should open the provision of basic health care services to paraprofessionals, working alone or in concert with vendors from other large retail and
consumer service sectors of the economy. Such vendors would bring their marketing and
management skills to health care – and do what American business has always been best

17

at doing -- reaching the bottom end of the market with no-frills service that are better than
no services at all.
IV.

Targets for Deregulation

Our list of targets fall into six discrete areas: medical malpractice, HIPAA, federal
tax law, fraud and abuse, health insurance regulation, and Certificate of Need/scope of
practice limitations. These reforms are grouped into a wide range of categories. Some of
these regulate the way in which medical care should be provided, by dealing with such
matters as insurance and privacy mandates. Others deal with standard business practices
of physicians, including various prohibitions on physician self-dealing in connection with
fraud and abuse statutes that carry with them the threat of heavy costs. Others deal with
questions of liability for services rendered in connection with medical malpractice. Most
important are the restrictions on licensing and the practice of medicine by nonphysicians.
For all their differences these multiple state interventions are all subject to one
dominant objection that surfaces in a thousand guises. The major strength of markets is
that they allow for a decentralized solutions to problems that seek to balance costs with
benefits. It would be foolish to insist that all markets move effortlessly to the optimal
solution to any problem. Such naiveté ignores the difficulties with the mistakes in
judgment that are common in complex situations. And it must make allowance for the
constant change in external conditions that require constant variations in institutional
response. Rather, the defense of markets is more cautious. In general, all market
participants seek to enter into arrangements under which they will gain from trade. When
both sides take this approach, the bargains that emerge should produce joint gains or
win/win outcomes. By aligning self-interest with an accurate internalization of costs and
benefits, market institutions will tend to correct errors more quickly than government
planners who neither bear the direct consequences of their mistakes nor are in a position
to reap a large portion of the gains from their innovations.15 In our view, the insistent
incentives to self-correction constitute one great advantage to voluntary markets.
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The redundancy of market institutions, which allows the weaker firms to fall by
the wayside, offers yet another advantage. All else being equal, the greater the level of
market freedom, the higher the level of innovation, and the wider the range of choices.
When government regulators seek to place certain arrangements out of bounds, they
restrict the scope of that joint freedom. The fewer remaining options for potential trading
partners means that the search for joint gains will be subject to constraints that produce
two huge forms of social losses: the increased costs of public oversight, and the inferior
private responses that are acceptable in light of that oversight. Of course, we do not think
that these twin considerations control in all cases. There is always a reason to be
concerned about contracts in restraint of trade – especially those practiced by physician
groups.16 But the restrictions on the organization of health care delivery that we address
do little to bolster horizontal arrangements in restraint of trade. They typically concern
the types of arrangements that physicians can enter into with patients, and that physicians
and patients can enter into with a range of third party intermediaries. All these restrictions
are costly. In this paper, our treatment on these matters cannot be exhaustive, but we hope
that the examples that we choose will prove suggestive.
Medical Malpractice The rules governing liability for medical practice have
created an open wound in health care over the past thirty-plus years. It may be asked
why the modern law of medical malpractice constitutes a form of government regulation
when it represents “merely” the evolution of ordinary common law rules of tort liability.
The response rests in the key relationship between medical malpractice and the doctrines
of freedom of contract. In the pre-1950 period there was little or no effort on the part of
health care providers to contract out of the tort system. The general view was that the
modest doctrines that existed may not have done much good, but they also did little harm.
It was always recognized that medical malpractice was a different species of tort liability
from road accidents. Most road accidents are easily resolved by deciding which (or both)
of two parties has complied with the rules of the road.

The level of error in the

application of the rules is relatively small, so that the rewards created by the system tend
to reinforce the proper forms of behavior that are otherwise enforced by licensing laws
before people drive and traffic fines and discipline during driving. The harms in question
16
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are usually imposed on other individuals, so that strict tort rules have the desirable effect
of reducing the overall rates of accidents.
The considerations that surround the imposition of tort liability in medical
malpractice are quite different.

Here the legal system must contend with obvious

differences in skill levels among physicians and hospitals, across localities and in
different specialties. It does no good to insist that all physicians and health care facilities
meet some average standard of care, if that standard is taken to imply that the bottom half
of physicians and hospitals are negligent in the routine application of their standards.
Instead the historical response was to rely on customary standards generated within the
profession to set the applicable standard of care.17 In addition, proof of negligence, save
in extraordinary cases, generally required the plaintiff to identify the particular flaw in the
defendant’s treatment of the patient, and to establish the causal connection between that
want of care and the injury that followed. Much effort was devoted to making it clear
that physician and hospital liability did not turn on simple errors in judgment, and that
physicians and hospitals could not be held liable solely because something went amiss
during their efforts to serve or save patients. The entire system was backed with the
presumption that conduct performed in good faith was entitled to a certain level of
deference. Exceptions to that rule were exceedingly narrow—i.e. res ipsa loquitur was
largely limited to cases where some external force injured the plaintiff in a different part
of their body than the surgical site.18
The key source of trouble came in the early 1960s in the highly influential
decision in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,19 when the California
Supreme Court adopted its highly influential paradigm of contract domination by large
firms relative to “powerless” individual patients and consumers. This approach allowed
the courts to invalidate even explicit efforts by defendant-institutions to contract out of
the tort system and disclaim tort liability. The reasons offered by courts and their
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academic supporters in support of this position seem to us to be most unpersuasive.20 We
readily concede—indeed we insist—that the provision of health care is a service of great
importance to members of the public. But it is a non sequitur to insist that the current
levels of care will necessarily be improved through government regulation. And it hardly
follows because hospitals open their doors to all comers that they should thereby
surrender their ability to determine the terms and conditions on which they provide
service. Quite the opposite. The heterogeneous nature of the patient base suggests that
the administration of health care system will be better if contracts are allowed to
standardize risk so that difficult patients—that pesky tail again—do not drive up the cost
of health care services for anyone else. Yet Tunkl did not see standardization as a
positive force against adverse selection and moral hazard, but only as form of adhesion
that deprived consumers of meaningful choice.
The correct analysis of this situation starts with a question that neither Tunkl nor
its progeny bother to ask: why did these exculpation clauses come into being around
1960, in both product liability and medical malpractice cases? Our answer does not
depend on, and in fact repudiates, theories of unequal bargaining power, which we think
highly unlikely in the face of intense competition in the health care sector both before and
after that time. Rather, we think that the key change in the legal environment was that
private institutions sensed that the drift in the tort law doctrines on malpractice had
moved away from rules that were close to a contractual optimum. The newer and more
expansive rules on liability were rightly perceived as imposing standards of care and
liability that was too costly and too unreliable. Before 1960, any imperfections of the tort
law were sufficiently small that it was not worth anyone’s effort to contract out from
them. After that time, as the substantive bases of liability started to expand, the costs of
contracting out were perceived to be far lower than those of staying with the system.
Why? The basic truth of all forms of contractual liability is that the expected
costs of settlement, verdicts and litigation must all come out of the fees that are generated
from the patients to whom service is provided. If that constraint is not met, the firm will
have to trim its patient or procedure list, alter its price structure or close its doors.
20
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Different organizations will opt for different strategies. Even the best of these strategies
will only mitigate the social losses (i.e. the sum of consumer and producer surplus)
relative to the first-best contractual solution. The slow ratcheting up of tort liability did
not stem from any single cause:

rules on custom became a bit more favorable to

plaintiffs; rules on res ipsa loquitur were more aggressively applied; inferences of
causation were subject to a greater degree of jury control; and damages continued to
move smartly upward.
Each of these changes in the decided cases took place independently, without
considering their synergistic interaction. Assume an oversimplified model in which each
of these four variables—standard of care, use of res ipsa loquitur, causation, and
damages—moves in favor of the plaintiff by 25 percent. This impact of the combined
shift suggests that liability will increase by 1.254 = 2.441 – or a near two and half fold
increase in liability in any given case, driving a corresponding increase in administrative
costs. Let them double — a more realistic estimate — and the number becomes 24, or
16—a real sea change. The higher rates of potential return will induce more cases to be
filed, with results varying depending on the application of those rules by juries that sit in
different counties. Although the overwhelming majority of cases are settled, settlement
terms are set in the shadow of the jury – and there is wide variation in the application of a
given set of rules within different regions and counties in a single state, let alone across
states.21 The ability of plaintiffs to handpick venue means that plaintiffs can pick those
places where the local judges and juries are most favorable to their cause.
The expansion of liability was driven by judges who thought that they were
correcting market imperfections, not creating them. Given their optimistic view of their
own handiwork, they saw little if any reason to increase the levels of judicial scrutiny to
guard against the risk of error. Quite the opposite, an increased deference to juries and a
decline in legal rules couched in terms of “reasonableness” heralded the arrival of a new
era. The expansion in liability plus the increase in overall expenses likely resulted in at
least some defensive medicine, although the precise magnitude has been exceedingly
21
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difficult to pin down. The decision of the California Board of Regents—a public body,
one might add—to restrict liability by contract was not casually made. Instead, it was
done in anticipation of the rough waters ahead once liability outpaced the ability for
various patients (and their third party payers) to cover the risk.
The decision to knock out these “adhesive” contracts eliminated all possibility of
private self-correction of judicial error in setting the rules on malpractice liability. Under
Tunkl and similar cases, all the relevant parameters in medical malpractice cases were
determined by judges and juries who had little or no understanding of the institutional
constraints that had led to such remarkable medical progress before the major expansion
of tort liability through judicial regulation. Judges did not understand that employers and
insurers have influence over the selection of health care providers; that hospitals have
internal review boards that check the systematic levels of performance of physicians and
other health care providers with a level of technical expertise that a jury cannot bring to
bear in making difficult judgment on individual cases — and doing so with a sample size
of one. Stated in a sentence, these decisions proceeded on the assumption that only
judicial expansion of the rules of liability stood between the individual patient and major
medical risk. The role of intermediate institutions in controlling or curtailing risk was
never discussed or considered.
But the evidence is now clear. What good has the malpractice system done? Not
much, and not nearly enough in light of its costs. The best empirical evidence suggests
that there are no significant differences in the rate of medical error in the Canadian
system in which medical malpractice liability is about a tenth of our own.22

The

American medical malpractice system massively under-deters potential tort-feasors, and
it massively under-compensates injured patients.23

The simple point here is that

underclaiming and overclaiming, compounded by high error rates and high costs of
22

Donald Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its
Alternatives: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 57 (1992).
23
See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation
and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1085 (2006) (finding
limited evidence the tort system deters medical errors); Patricia Danzon, Liability for
Medical Malpractice, Handbook of Health Economics (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse
(2000) (same); Michelle M. Mello, & Troyen A Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 Texas L. Rev. 1595 (2002) (same).
23

running the system give it insufficient deterrent effect. Physicians and hospitals do not
know how to alter conduct in response to a set of signals that say “take better care,”
without providing clearer guidance as to what should be done next. Yet interest in
allowing contractual freedom back into the system remains tepid at best.24
The saga of medical malpractice liability is not just a tale of good intentions and
bad outcomes. It also helps explain some of the cost and access problems that dog the
health care system. The high cost of medical malpractice and malpractice insurance can
close down emergency rooms, place intolerable burdens on rural clinics serving poor
populations, stifle various forms of innovation because of more or less well-founded fear
that adverse consequences will generate crushing liability, and in some instances, it can
lead physicians to exit high risk specialties and high-risk jurisdictions.25 Reversing the
decision in Tunkl should lead to a renewed competition among hospitals and physicians
in the provision of alternatives to the existing liability system, and in the range of medical
care offering. It could induce third party intermediaries to take more active steps to shape
liability rules and dispute resolution processes in ways that lower costs. At this point no
one can say for sure what the new contractual provisions would require; one cannot even
be confident that they would be the same for all procedures and all specialties in all
locations. Indeed, it is equally plausible that they will vary in accordance with the needs
and circumstances of particular institutions, counties, states specialties, and practices.
Deregulation allows us to harness the private information that is available to health care
providers and the large institutions with which they do business. We cannot predict how
much would be saved, except to say that we do not think it would be trivial. Regardless
of the actual magnitude of savings, moving from tort to contract represents an important
and necessary step in our general program of increasing access by reducing costs.
Privacy Reform The second topic of reform involves the use of government
regulation to protect the privacy interests of patients. The key statute on this front is the
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or HIPAA.26 The title of the statute
references its original goals: portability (enhancing the ability of employees and their
dependents to have uninterrupted health insurance coverage when they change jobs) and
accountability (fraud control). HIPAA also contained a single paragraph, instructing
HHS to prepare regulations to ensure patient privacy if Congress was unable to pass
legislation on the subject within a two year period.
In due course, HIPAA regulations were issued by HHS on the eve of the Clinton
Administration’s departure from office.

The regulations take a divided attitude on

consent. Information can be released without the consent of patients for a wide variety of
purposes, including billing and government oversight. But in many other instances,
patient privacy is protected by insisting patients must give individual consent to the
dissemination and use of all relevant information about them within standard medical
settings. HIPAA thus created a huge pre-clearance apparatus, and displaced the previous
ex post system which supplied various tort actions against physicians who flouted wellestablished privacy norms.27
The central question about HIPAA is whether an ex ante pre-clearance system is
justified given the absence of evidence that the prior system of ex post remedies was
inadequate. In our view the answer to that question is a resounding no. There is no costjustified reason to impose highly restrictive regulations on ordinary human interactions to
deal with a set of problems that have already been effectively controlled by clear social
norms and institutional practices, backed up in rare instances by legal action. Why incur
costs in 100 percent of social interactions when the ex post system (which is still
available) needs to be invoked only in an infinitesimal number of situations?
We can think of no good answer to these questions. There is every reason why no
groundswell of public support coalesced around the HIPAA regulations, most of which
26
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met with resistance or disbelief from the public at large. It did not take HIPAA to make
every health care provider acutely aware of the huge damage to good will that follows
from any breach in the security surrounding sensitive information. We are confident that
voluntary markets were already taking simple, common-sense, cost-justified steps to deal
with these issues, and did at a cost far less than that associated with HIPAA.28 Consider a
simple example: the typical psychiatrist’s office does not have a waiting room populated
with nervous patients waiting to see their analysts. Everyone understands that seeing
someone else in the waiting room is itself viewed as a serious invasion of privacy. The
typical office has incoming patients arriving at staggered intervals, and outgoing patients
exit through another door. Not foolproof to be sure, but clearly sensible. Similarly, most
employers have figured out that they will not be able to encourage their workers to get
counseling for alcohol, eating or substance abuse if the results of these sessions are
recorded in personnel files for all persons within the firm to see. So services of this sort
are farmed out to third persons under pledges of confidentiality whereby the results of
those sessions never make it into the personnel file of the particular employees. We
suspect that similar institutional accommodations can be multiplied a thousand-fold by
persons who are closer to the issue than we are.
So just what does HIPAA do to add to the mix? A quick inspection of the
massive government website reveals just how intrusive HIPAA has become in regulating
patient behavior in the name of protecting patient autonomy. HIPAA’s frequently asked
questions (FAQs) reveal that a doctor can call a patient’s wife to tell her that he has been
in a car accident, or a husband that his wife is about to deliver, or one roommate about
the injury of another, or in an emergency situation that a father has suffered a stroke. For
these insights, do we need government approval and thousands of pages of regulations
and interpretations? There is no indication that individual physicians and practices could
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not tackle this issue, taking account of obvious and not so obvious variations in the types
of treatment and patient population.
The regulations also do not take advantage of the three most important words in
any regulatory framework that wants to harness private information in the face of diverse
circumstances: “unless otherwise agreed.” Instead of creating a default framework that
autonomous and competent patients can contract around, the HIPAA framework, with its
carefully crafted list of examples, exceptions, and repeated use of the word “may” (but
never “must”) raises many more questions than it answers. Physicians go to medical
school – but the HIPAA framework is built around law school hypotheticals. How
should the doctor who calls the patient’s wife to speak about minor injuries behave with
single or divorced people, or unmarried couples living together? Does one illustration
imply that other types of calls should be regarded as invasions of privacy? Or be counted
as similar cases to be treated in similar ways? May, must, a doctor tell the unmarried
father that a pregnant woman is about to give birth? And may friends who are not
roommates be told about injuries? The petty nature of these examples raise as many
questions as they answer, and they cast a pall over common sense in the day-to-day
administration, at least for people who do not keep a copy of the federal register at their
bedside. Scrap HIPAA, and any type of health care system, from single-payer to fee-forservice, will perform better.
Insurance Mandates. It is striking that growth in the overall economy has been
associated with growth in both the number of insurance mandates and the number of
uninsured. Some mandates regulate the relationship between insurance companies and
health care providers, by requiring that the insurance plan include “any willing provider,”
and cover services rendered by chiropractors (46 states), psychologists (44 states) and
optometrists (43 states).29

Others require insurance companies to issue benefits to

various types of coverage to their patients. These include coverage of newborns (50
states), alcoholism treatment (45 states) diabetic supplies (47 states), breast
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reconstruction after mastectomy (48 states), and mammograms (50 states).30

What

impresses us is that the rise of mandates tracks the decline in the percentage of
individuals in covered plans at a time when greater individual wealth should leave more
funds for health care. In our view, mandates are part of the explanation. Mandates
require persons either to purchase more insurance than they want or to exit the market.
They constrain competition in the financing and delivery of health care services. And
then tend to take money from the poor and working class, and giving to the upper middle
class, who provide (and disproportionately receive) the mandated services.31

The

McCarran-Ferguson Act, by creating state-specific monopolies in health insurance
regulation, makes these problems particularly acute. The absence of a national market
raises the cost of insurance in local markets, thereby reducing the overall fraction of the
population that is able to purchase this insurance.32 The removal of this prohibition has
no direct budgetary costs, and huge social benefits. We see no reason why this kind of
restriction cannot be eliminated immediately. If states want to regulate inefficiently, they
should bear the costs of their inefficiency, and not impose it on other states with more
prudent polices. Similarly, if states want to engage in redistribution, let jurisdictional
competition forces them to confront squarely the costs of their largesse. Any rigorous
program of reform should eliminate needless roadblocks to greater coverage.
Similar objections can be made about any system of community rating, which
seeks to equalize the rates charged to individuals for health care insurance. Building in
the dubious notion that health insurance is a merit good, the program in effect requires
low-risk individuals to purchase insurance at the community rate, if they wish to purchase
it at all. Sometimes the prohibition is directed various forms of discrimination, such as
that based on genetic condition, as in rules that make it set premiums without taking into
account the differential costs of AIDS or various genetic disabilities.33 The net effect is
30
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drive low-risk persons from voluntary plans.

In response the state can coerce all

individuals to purchase health insurance at state-determined rates, creating covert wealth
transfers. In still other situations, the nondiscrimination norm may be invoked under
HIPAA in order to prevent employers from offering lower rates of insurance to workers
who take steps to improve their health,34 thereby reducing the overall health of the
population. This incident is one amongst many which indicates the transformation of the
antidiscrimination principle in health care politics.

At its core, that principle was

intended to prevent the redistribution of wealth across multiple users of a public utility.
The principle thus required the same payments for persons who imposed the same
burdens on the common system. But individuals that imposed greater costs on the system
had to pay higher rates. Now it is inverted. Nondiscrimination thus requires that only
equal charges be imposed on individuals regardless of the differential burdens they
impose on the system. This new version of the principle thus mandates cross subsidies
from healthy to unhealthy persons, reducing the returns to good health and increasing the
returns to bad habits. The revised nondiscrimination principle thus undermines the very
health that the various systems of regulation seek to create. Every version of “social
insurance” of social insurance will have precisely this deleterious effect. We see no
reason why either federal or state regulation should frustrate the efforts of private persons
to reduce health care costs.
Taxation. Federal tax law provides a substantial subsidy for employment-based
health insurance, as the premiums are deductible to the employer but not taxable as
income to the employee.35 This tax subsidy is the source of considerable inequities and
allocative inefficiency.36

The inequities arise in part because employees (or at least

some employees) receive a subsidy that is denied to others. The allocative waste arises
because the subsidy for health care leads to its overconsumption relative to other goods.
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There is no shortage of proposals on the best way to fix the problem.37 The first best
solution is to repeal the federal tax break for these premiums, which removes both
problems. We think that it is decidedly a second-best solution to extend the deduction of
health care premiums to other form of payments, as it is generally unwise to expend
political capital to solve one problem (inequities) at the cost of exacerbating the second
problem (overconsumption of health care). In a normative paper, we do not choose to
engage in political squabbles of the choice of the least grotesque compromise position.
Fraud and Abuse Statutes The question of fraud and abuse is a subspecies of the
larger question of conflicts of interest and self-dealing that pervade the health care area.
In many cases, one individual will enter into transactions with a related company. A
physician, for example, may choose to have lab work done by a firm in which he has a
partial interest.

In some circumstances, this self-dealing could lead to unnecessary

charges. In other cases, the close connection between the two firms could result in
cooperation that lower costs. In our view, it is difficult to decide whether the efficiencies
involved in these cases outweighs the dangers of abuse.
Under our present legal system, however, the law takes a very grim view of these
arrangements among related firms. More specifically, three different statutes provide the
basic framework for addressing fraud and abuse in health care. The anti-kickback statute
broadly criminalizes the solicitation or receipt of remuneration in connection with items
or services for which payment can be made by Medicare or Medicaid. There are various
statutory exceptions, administrative regulations creating safe harbors, and advisory
opinions covering a range of circumstances. Prosecutions have been rare, and have
focused on the most egregious fact patterns, even though the statutory language and
precedent sweep much more broadly.
Next, the self-referral provisions prohibit physicians from referring Medicare and
Medicaid patients to ancillary providers in which they or their family members hold a
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financial interest, and prohibit ancillary providers for billing for services that result from
such referrals. The provisions are treated as creating strict liability offenses, punishable
by program exclusion and civil monetary penalties.
Finally, the False Claims Act creates a cause of action against those who
knowingly present a false claim to the government.

Violations are punishable by

substantial statutory penalties per claim, and a fine of three times any overpayments.
As one of us (Hyman) noted in an earlier article, the state regulation of fraud and
abuse raises substantial problems with statutory over-inclusiveness and underinclusiveness. These system design errors are compounded by overzealous enforcement,
and excessive investment in compliance programs. The self-referral provisions have
utterly failed in their attempt to provide clear guidance, and the false claims act has
created a significant risk of blackmail settlements.38 We suggest outright repeal of the
self-referral provisions, and modification of the false claims act to minimize the risk of
misuse.
We do not suggest repeal of the anti-kickback statute. Although we believe those
responsible at HHS should create more safe harbors, and be substantially more flexible in
their interpretation of the statute in advisory opinions, the statute is an important guardian
of the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program, given that the overwhelming majority of
Medicare beneficiaries are still in the traditional (fee-for-service) part of the program,
where kickbacks pose an obvious incentive for overutilization.
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Free Entry for all: Eliminating Limitations on Scope of Practice The history of
health care in the United States is marked by consistent and effective attempts by
physicians to limit competition from less expensive alternative providers. The American
Medical Association’s (AMA) basic position on health matters is that all interested
parties had to accept “the private physician’s monopoly control of the medical market
and complete authority over all aspects of medical institutions.”39 Professors Havighurst
& King concisely describe the standard playbook employed by the AMA and its allies:
[O]utbreaks of . . . competition were ruthlessly suppressed, with the result
that the hegemony of the dominant ideology was seldom challenged. Under the
banners of “medical science,” “quality of care,” and “professional prerogative,”
the medical profession was able to repel most attacks along its borders, to force
many of its antagonists into alliances, and to confine other would-be invaders to
narrow enclaves.40
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In the past half-century, antitrust enforcement has placed substantial limits on the
ability of the medical profession to engage in such conduct.

However, the rise of

managed care brought forth new strategies, including unionization, “Astroturf”
campaigns targeting specific managed care practices, and disciplinary proceedings
against medical directors of managed care organizations. Such conduct is not limited to
physicians; hospitals have engaged in similar battles with physician owned ambulatory
surgery centers and single specialty hospitals. Hospitals have used certificate of need
statutes to delay and deter entry by new competitors, and limit the ability of existing
competitors to broaden their range of services and improve their infrastructure. Hospitals
also lobbied aggressively for stricter regulatory requirements for specialty hospitals, and
even secured an 18 month moratorium on Medicare reimbursement of such institutions.
The latest delivery-side innovation is the opening of outpatient clinics in retail
outlets. Such facilities offer a restricted range of services, focusing on those necessary to
help patients “get well” and “stay well.”41 Most are staffed by nurse-practitioners or
physician assistants, backed up by extensive use of standardized protocols, computerized
decision support tools, and electronic medical records. Pricing is completely transparent,
hours are long, and parking is free and freely available. The available evidence suggests
that quality of care is at least as high as in traditional health care delivery channels – and
in many instances higher.42
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The response of the medical profession to retail clinics is largely déjà vu all over
again, with the standard set condemnations involving quality and continuity of care –
along with an occasional candid admission that physicians are concerned about loss of
revenue and market power.43

As expected, retail clinics have been condemned by

professional societies, including the AMA and the American Academy of Pediatrics.44
We have no brief for any given health care delivery system or system reform. But
we do insist on one general point. New entry is the single most powerful force for
restructuring a dysfunctional industry, like health care.. Those entering will deviate from
the established methods within the field – often by unbundling or rebundling the mix of
goods and services that are on offer, or de-skilling the provision of services. Many of
these innovations will fail, at some social cost. But the minority of innovations that
“take” can easily produce gains that dwarf the losses from failed experiments. Although
these initiatives face opposition from incumbent providers, no one has a property right in
doing business the way they prefer. We take this position for every trade and profession,
including our own. The alternative is to accept inefficient feather-bedding and long-term
stagnation, To be sure, new entry presents real difficulties in health care, given the
problems of quality control. We do not suggest that a market offering only “snake oil” to
the uninformed is desirable. But it is a mistake to assume that informational deficits do
not also affect public regulators. Indeed, our view is that markets are usually better able
to collect and disseminate information and coordinate behavior than alternative
institutional arrangements.
The great advantage of free entry is that no one at the center has to have the
foggiest notion of why one program of innovation works when other fails. There are
ruthless but honest checks on behavior, coupled with constant innovation, and rapid
dissemination of successes.
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To us, these recent developments promise greater access through lower costs. But
we can offer no guarantee of that result. All we can do is to insist with all the vehemence
we can muster that on matters as these the market—the individual preferences of
countless consumers — should be the judge of what consumers do and don’t want to
receive. Deregulation helps ensure that consumers – and not some providers backed by
the force of the state – determine that issue. Were we writing on a blank slate, we would
support certification instead of licensure as the basic model for certifying competence.
Failing that, we support dramatically loosening the prohibitions on scope of practice that
currently complicate the ability of retail clinics to use nurse-practitioners and physician
assistants.
III.

Conclusion

We anticipate that our proposals will be met by howls of protest from those who
benefit from the status quo and their apologists. Such complaints should be seen for what
they are – a defense of rent-seeking by incumbent providers.

The whole point of

deregulation is to limit the opportunity and rewards of rent-seeking, thereby increasing
consumer surplus. No administrative agency or committee of experts, no matter how
well-intentioned and knowledgeable, will be able to do a better job of meeting consumer
demands than the private market. To think otherwise is to repeat the mistakes of the past,
instead of learning from them.
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